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DAMAGES FOR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
A Louisiana litigant who suffers delay or harassment because of an
adversary's groundless appeal is afforded a remedy by Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 2164, which provides in pertinent part: "The
court may award damages for frivolous appeal . . . ." The appellee who
seeks damages under article 2164, however, must overcome a serious
obstacle-the extreme reluctance of the courts to penalize an appellant
unless the abuse of the appeals system is flagrant.' In Parker v. Interstate
Life & Accident Insurance Co.,2 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal awarded damages under article 2164 after finding that in view
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, the appellant must
have known that he had no chance, as a matter of law, to succeed in
his appeal. 3 The Louisiana Supreme Court, in its only decision interpreting
article 2164, reversed the appellate court and set forth the following test
as to when an award of damages is appropriate under that article:
[Diamages for frivolous appeal are not allowable unless it is ob-
vious that the appeal was taken solely for delay or that counsel
is not sincere in the view of the law he advocates even though
the court is of the opinion that such view is not meritorious.
. . . [Wihen counsel proclaims his sincerity, a court finds itself
without just cause to disbelieve unless, and only unless, the pro-
position advocated is so ridiculous or so opposed to rational think-
ing that it is evident beyond any doubt that it is being deliberately
professed for ulterior purposes.4
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
I. Louisiana courts have stated consistently that appeals are favored and are to be
aided by the courts, and thus damages for frivolous appeals are to be awarded only in
extreme cases. See In re Liquidation of Thrift Homestead Ass'n, 202 La. 309, 315, II So.
2d 599, 601 (1942); Goad v. May, 376 So. 2d 340, 342 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Coleman
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Cobb, 366 So. 2d 994, 996 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Jackson v. East
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 348 So. 2d 739, 741 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
2. 172 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
3. Id. at 370.
4. Parker v. Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 248 La. 449, 455-57, 179 So. 2d 634,
636-37 (1965).
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Judicial Application of Article 2164
The first penalty for frivolous appeal in Louisiana was provided in
article 907 of the Code of Practice of 1825, which was retained without
change in the 1870 revision of the Code of Practice. This article permit-
ted the appellate court to assess against the appellant "such damages as
it may think equivalent to the loss which [the appellee] has sustained by
the delay consequent on the appeal . . . ." Damages were limited by
the article to ten percent of the amount in dispute and were allowed by
the courts only on a suspensive appeal' from a money judgment. 6
When the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in 1961, Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 2164 replaced article 907 of the Code
of Practice. The new article broadened the scope of damages the court
could award. 7 Louisiana courts now are free to award damages, including
attorneys' fees,' in any amount on any type of judgment, monetary or
nonmonetary, and on both suspensive and devolutive appeals.9
While article 2164 broadened the scope of damages against the
frivolous appellant, Louisiana courts have continued to follow cases
decided under article 907 in determining when those penalties should be
assessed.'" The courts historically have refused to allow damages when
the appellant is in good faith," when the appellant or his attorney has
5. Mutual Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 50 La. Ann. 1332, 1333, 24 So. 304, 305 (1898);
Chaffe v. Carroll, 35 La. Ann. 115, 116 (1883); Harrisonburg-Catahoula State Bank v.
Meyers, 185 So. 96, 98 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Dubach Mill Co. v. M. M. Carroll Lumber
Co., 4 La. App. 207, 210 (2d Cir. 1926).
6. Racoby v. People's Furn. Co., 175 La. 383, 387, 143 So. 334, 335 (1932); Carrano
v. Colombel, 164 La. 739, 742, 114 So. 637, 637 (1927); Arrowsmith v. Rappelege, 19 La.
Ann. 328, 329 (1867); Jourdan v. Hutton, 86 So. 2d 223, 225 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
7. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2164, comment (e); Lanza Enters. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
129 So. 2d 91, 94 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
8. Moity v. Busch, 368 So. 2d 1134, 1137 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Coleman Oldsmobile,
Inc. v. Cobb, 366 So. 2d 994, 997 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Samford v. Samford, 297
So. 2d 465, 467-68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
9. In Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), the court refused
to assess damages under article 2164 against a party who appealed devolutively, stating that
there was no showing that the appeal was taken solely for delay, and that being only
devolutive, it could serve no delaying purpose. Damages still could be awarded on a devolutive
appeal, however, if the claim as advanced by appellant's attorney is not serious (given the
status of the law on that topic) or where the appeal is abandoned.
10. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Parker v. Interstate Life & Accident Insurance
Co., 248 La. at 455, 179 So. 2d at 636, stated that article 2164 does not change this prior
jurisprudence. See also Lanza Enters. v. Continental Ins. Co., 129 So. 2d 91, 94 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961) (asserting the belief that article 2164 was not intended to effect a change
in the jurisprudence).
11. Macaluso v. Succession of Marinoni, 184 La. 1052, 1054, 168 So. 296, 297 (1936);
Jung v. Gwin, 176 La. 962, 974, 147 So. 47, 50 (1933); Connolly v. Connolly, 316 So.
2d 167, 168 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (The court refused to assess penalties against a hus-
band who prosecuted the appeal of divorce judgment in proper person with express motive
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made an honest mistake,' 2 when questions of fact are involved,' 3 or when
the judgment is modified in part on appeal. 4 Damages have long been
awarded under the test stated in Parker (i.e., when the appeal is taken
solely for delay or when the appellant's attorney is not sincere in the view
of the law which he advocates).' 5 Damages have also been allowed when
the appellant abandons the appeal, even though the grounds for appeal
might have been meritorious,' 6 or when the law is free from doubt, that
is, when the issue has been decided previously by the Louisiana Supreme
Court," but not when it has merely been decided earlier by the same
appellate court that is hearing the present case.' 8
Even if the appellee clearly has grounds for damages under article
of effecting a reconciliation, stating that a layman would not be held to the same standards
of skill and judgment that must be attributed to an attorney.); Romero v. Galley, 79 So.
2d 625, 628 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
12. Southern Coal Co. v. Sundbery & Winkler, 158 La. 386, 389, 104 So. 124, 125
(1925); Thomas v. Guilbeau, 35 La. Ann. 927, 929-30 (1883) (Defendant-appellant erroneously
contended that a mortgage granted in'1877 by plaintiff had to be registered under the 1880
homestead act to be exempt from seizure. The mortgagor apparently was under the same
mistaken belief when he attempted to register his homestead after judgment had been rendered
recognizing the mortgage. Court held the mortgage was governed by the 1865 act, which
did not require registration, but no penalties would be assessed since appellant's honest
mistake had been superinduced by appellee's own error.).
13. Wendling v. Parnin, 170 La. 504, 507, 128 So. 291, 292 (1930); Austin & McWilliams
v. Moore, 16 La. Ann. 218, 218 (1861); Hullen v. Connolly, 4 La. 18, 19 (1832); Barrow
v. Unity Indus. Life Ins. Co., 18 La. App. 645, 646, 139 So. 77, 78 (Orl. 1932).
14. Starwood v. Taylor, 434 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Lynch v.
Derr6rry, 339 So. 2d 507, 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 341 So.
2d 902 (La. 1977); Galloway v. Minckler, 63 So. 2d 891, 892 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953);
Swart v. Lisbon Iberia Oil Corp., 197 So. 152, 153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
15. Samford v. Samford, 297 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974) (Wife appealed divorce
judgment on sole basis that a judge, other than the one to whom the case had originally
been assigned, heard separation suit in violation of local rules, even though her counsel
had made no objection at either the separation or divorce trial. The court held that the
sole reason for the appeal was to prolong payment of alimony pendente lite by husband-
appellee and assessed penalties under article 2164.); Smith v. Most Worshipful St. John's
Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons, 17 La. App. 536, 537, 135 So. 675, 676 (2d
Cir. 1931); Mauberet v. Mauberet, 12 La. App. 553, 554-55, 125 So. 886, 886-87 (Orl. 1930).
16. Hohl v. Meyer, 7 La. Ann. 18, 18 (1852) (Although evidence of defendant-appellant's
indebtedness was not sufficient to support the judgment, it was affirmed with a penalty
for frivolous appeal since the appellant had abandoned the appeal.); Mathews v. 8 Mile
Post Plumbing Supplies, 70 So. 2d 218, 220 (La. App. Orl. 1954); Hutchinson Bros. v.
Blanchard, 8 La. App. 134, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1928). An appeal is presumed abandoned when
the appellant makes no appearance in the appellate court, files no brief, and makes no
argument. Louisiana Knights of Pythias v. Natchitoches Lodge No. 89, 215 La. 300, 302,
40 So. 2d 472, 472 (1949); Mathews v. 8 Mile Post Plumbing Supplies, 70 So. 2d 218,
220 (La. App. Orl. 1954).
17. Calhoun v. Star Ins. Co., 159 La. 77, 81-82, 105 So. 231, 232 (1925); State v.
Schonhausen, 37 La. Ann. 42, 43 (1885).
18. . Southern Coal Co. v. Sundbery & Winkler, 158 La. 386, 389, 104 So. 124, 125 (1925).
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2164 as interpreted by the courts, damages will be awarded only if the
appellee has asked for the sanctions in his answer to the appeal' 9 but
has not asked for an amendment of the judgment and the judgment has
been affirmed in all respects.2" The sanctions available under article 2164
include only monetary damages-Louisiana courts will not dismiss an ap-
peal on grounds of frivolity.2 Further, although an appellee may obtain
dismissal of an appeal which an appellant has abandoned,22 the appellee
cannot obtain damages under article 2164 unless the action has been heard
on the merits by the appellate courts.23
Frivolous Appeal in Other Jurisdictions
Louisiana's frivolous appeal statute is similar to those found in
thirty-six of Louisiana's sister states" and in the federal appellate
19. Cheramie v. Vegas, 413 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Prosperity
Park, Inc. v. Barton, 404 So. 2d 1307, 1311 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); La. Code Civ. P.
art. 2133.
20. Parker, Seale & Kelton v. Messina, 214 Lt. 203, 213, 36 So. 2d 724, 728 (1948);
Dennis v. Huber, 151 La. 589, 592, 92 So. 126, 127 (1922); Whetstone v. Rawlins, 26 La.
Ann. 474, 477 (1874).
21. Kendrick v. Garrene, 231 La. 462, 470, 91 So. 2d 603, 606 (1956); Dardenne v.
Schwing, III La. 318, 319, 35 So. 583, 583 (1903); Rainers v. St. Ceran, 27 La. Ann.
112, 112 (1875); Macedonia Baptist Found. v. Singleton, 379 So. 2d 267, 268 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1979).
22. La. Cts. App. R.S. 2-8.6, 2-12.12, in West's Louisiana Rules of Court 1984. This
rule has been eliminated by the Louisiana Supreme Court since the majority of that court's
appeals are criminal and since the dismissal of an appeal for abandonment raises constitu-
tional questions of inadequate representation of counsel. La. Sup. Ct. R. 5, comment (4),
in West's Louisiana Rules of Court 1984.
23. Dardenne v. Schwing, 111 La. 318, 319, 35 So. 583, 583 (1903); Thomas v. Guilbeau,
35 La. Ann. 927, 930 (1883).
24. Ala. R. App. P. 38, in Ala. Code § 23 (1975); Alaska Sup. Ct. R. 39, in Alaska
Rules of Ct. Proc. & Admin. (1963); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2106 (1982); Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 906 (West 1980); Cal. Civ. & Crim. R. 26(a), tit. I, div. I (West 1981);
Col. App. R. 38(d), in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7(B) (1973); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.105 (West
Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-6 (1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 607-14.5 (Supp. 1983);
Idaho Ct. R., Civ. Proc. R. 54(e)(1), in Idaho Code (1980); Ind. Ct. R. Bk. 2, App. Proc.
R. 15(G) in Ind. Code Ann. (Burns 1980); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2701a, R.7.07(b) (1983);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300 (1983); Maine R. Civ. P. 76(f), in West's Maine Rules of Court
1984; Mass. R. App. P. 25, in Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1982); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 211, § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2445(3)
(West Supp. 1984); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 138, in West's Mnnesota Rules of Court 1984;
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-3-23 (1972); Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.19, in West's Missouri Rules of
Court 1984; Mont. R. App. Civ. P. 32, in Mont. Code Ann. § 21 (1983); Nev. R. App.
P. 38, in Nev. Rev. Stat. (1979); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 490:14(a) (1983); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 39-3-27 (1983); N.C. R. App. P. 34, in West's North Carolina Rules of Court 1984;
N.D. R. App. P. 38, in N.D. Cent. Code § 5B (1974); Ohio R. App. P. 23, in West's
Ohio Rules of Court 1984; Or. Rev. Stat. § 19.160 (1981); Pa. R. App. P. 2744, in West's
Pennsylvania Rules of Court 1984; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-22-16 (1970); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 16-2-29.4 (Supp. 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (1980); Tex. R. Civ. P. 438,
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system.2" Two of those states, North Carolina and South Dakota, penalize
frivolous appeals by dismissal alone,26 while the remaining states impose
monetary sanctions on the appellant, and in four of those states, on his
counsel as well.27 Monetary sanctions against the appellant and his counsel
are also available to the federal appellate courts.28 Additionally, four of
the states with frivolous appeal statutes also penalize frivolous civil actions
at the trial court level.29
The penalties which may be imposed under these statutes vary widely.
Rhode Island limits the penalty which the appellee may recover to treble
costs.30 Five states award punitive interest, ranging from five to twelve
percent per annum,3' while a penalty of ten percent of the judgment may
be imposed in seven states.32 Mississippi awards only five percent of the
judgment as a penalty," but larger penalties are imposed in Utah, where
twenty-five percent of the judgment can be assessed against the appellant,34
and Hawaii, where reasonable attorneys' fees of up to twenty-five per-
cent of the original ad damnum may be awarded." Many of the other
states and the federal system have open-ended penalties; these statutes
provide for "reasonable," "just," or "proper" damages and may include
attorneys' fees, costs, and other expenses on appeal. 6
in West's Texas Rules of Court 1983; Utah R. Civ. P. 73(1), in Utah Code Ann. § 9(B)
(1977); Va. Code § 16.1-113 (1982); Wash. R. App. P. 18.9(a), in Washington Court Rules
(1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 809.25(3) (West Supp. 1983); Wyo. R. App. P. 10.05, in Wyom-
ing Court Rules Ann. (1979).
25. Fed. R. App. P. 38; 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982).
26. N.C. R. App. P. 34, in West's North Carolina Rules of Court 1984; S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 16-2-29.4 (Supp. 1983).
27. Ala. R. App. P. 38, in Ala. Code § 23 (1975); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 906 (West
1980); Wash. R. App. P. 18.9(a), in Washington Court Rules; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 809.25(3)
(West 1983).
28. Fed. R. App. P. 38; 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982).
29. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.105 (West Supp. 1983); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 607-14.5 (Supp.
1983); Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1), in Idaho Code (1980); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 16-2-29.4
(Supp. 1983).
30. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-2-16 (1970).
31. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 211 § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974) (12%); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 490: 14-1 (1983) (12%); Pa. R. App. P. 2744, in West's Pennsylvania Rules of
Court 1984 (606 plus $25 attorneys' fees); Va. Code § 16.1-113 (1982) (100o); Wyo. R.
App. P. 10.05, in Wyoming Court Rules Ann. (1979) (506 on suspensive appeal of money
judgment).
32. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2106 (1982); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-6 (1982); Ind. R.
App. P. 15(G), in Ind. Code Ann. (Burns 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300 (1983); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 39-3-27 (1983); Or. Rev. Stat. § 19.160 (1981); Tex. R. Civ. P. 438, in West's
Texas Rules of Court 1983.
33. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-3-23 (1972). The penalty is assessed against all unsuccessful
appellants.
34. Utah R. Civ. P. 73(l), in Utah Code Ann. § 9(B) (1977).
35. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 607-14.5 (Supp. 1983).
36. Allowable items of "just" or "proper" damages are set forth statutorily in many
states. In other states, and in the federal system, allowable damages are determined
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While many of these statutes set forth the possible penalties with
specificity, few define the term "frivolous" or set forth a test as to when
damages should be awarded. The exceptions are the statutes of Oregon
and Washington. The Oregon statute states that damages of ten percent
of the judgment "shall be given . . . unless it appears evident to the
appellate court that there was probable cause for taking the appeal," 37
while the Washington statute states that an appeal is frivolous when:
1. The appeal or cross-appeal was filed, used or continued in bad
faith, solely for the purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring
another.
2. The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have known,
that the appeal or cross-appeal was without any reasonable basis
in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argu-
ment for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.38
In the remaining states and under the federal rules, where the meaning
of "frivolous" has been left to the courts, there seems to be no unifor-
mity of judicial definition." The tests vary widely, ranging from objec-
tive to extremely subjective. For example, the California Supreme Court
stated that an appeal is frivolous "when any reasonable attorney would
agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit,''4 0 while
the Indiana courts will award damages for frivolous appeal only upon
"a strong showing of bad faith."' No consensus on this issue is apparent
among the federal appellate circuits, or even among different panels of
the same circuit."2 Appeals taken in bad faith have been penalized by
federal courts, 3 as have appeals taken when the existing federal case law
jurisprudentially. See Fed. R. App. P. 38, advisory committee notes, in 28 U.S.C. at 492
(1982); A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 303 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962); Ex-
hibitor's Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 78 F.R.D. 192 (E.D. La. 1978).
37. Or. Rev. Stat. § 19.160 (1981).
38. Wash. R. App. P. 18.9(a), in Washington Court Rules (1978).
39. See Oberman, Coping with Rising Caseload I1: Defining the Frivolous Civil Ap-
peal, 47 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1057, 1061 (1981); Note, Penalties for Frivolous Appeals, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1930).
40. In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 638, 646 P.2d 179, 187, 183 Cal. Rptr.
508, 516 (1982).
41. Annee v. State, 256 Ind. 686, 692, 274 N.E.2d 260, 261 (1971).
42. Judges of the second circuit appear to be divided on whether a showing of bad
faith is required before sanctions can be imposed. In West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
440 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), the court stated
that a "clear showing of bad faith" was required. In Miracle Mile Associates v. City of
Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1980), the court refused to penalize the appellant
because there was no finding of bad faith. Yet in Bank of Canton v. Republic National
Bank, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), the court found sua sponte, without reference to bad
faith or vexatious conduct by the appellant, that the appeal was completely frivolous.
43. See, e.g., Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1980); Browning Debenture
Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).
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clearly and unambiguously supported the judgment." For example, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that an appeal is frivolous
"when the result is obvious . . . or the'arguments are 'wholly without
merit'." 45 Other judicial definitions of the term "frivolous" (none of which
is particularly enlightening) include "manifestly and palpably without
merit,""' "flagrantly groundless,"" 7 and "perilously close to being an abuse
of process."" Ultimately, the question of whether or not damages are
awarded to an appellee is left by the various state legislatures to the sound
discretion of the appellate courts.
In states which have no frivolous appeal sanctions, the courts rely
on the integrity and common sense of the bar. The West Virginia Supreme
Court stated in Hinkle v. Black 9 that restraints on frivolous cases are
unnecessary because attorneys recognize that such suits fall on deaf ears,
and consequently an attorney will not waste time and money in a vain
process." Additionally, the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes
ethical restraints on attorneys relative to filing frivolous appeals. An at-
torney ethically may not continue to represent a client who wants to appeal
solely to harass an opponent.' Also, an attorney must treat all persons
involved in the legal process with consideration and avoid inflicting needless
harm.5
When a client desires to appeal after he has been advised by his at-
torney that he has but a slight chance of success, however, the attorney
is faced with an ethical dilemma. He is bound to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law under Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Even if he has advised his client against an
appeal, he ethically may continue to represent the client and take the ap-
peal as long as the legal position taken is not "frivolous." 3 A non-
frivolous position, according to the Code of Professional Responsibility,
is one that can be supported by a "good faith argument for an exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of the law." 5 "Good faith" would seem
to require some chance, however slight, of success on appeal. In a state
44. Exhibitors Poster Exchange v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 543 F.2d 1106 (5th
Cir. 1976); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
45. NLRB v. Catalina Yachts, 679 F.2d 180, 182 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Libby, McNeill
& Libby v. City Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1978)).
46. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Makahuena Corp., 670 P.2d 760, 767 n.5 (Hawaii 1983).
47. Freitag v. Freitag, 318 N.W.2d 760, 762 (N.D. 1982).
48. Good Hope Refs. v. Brashear, 588 F.2d 846, 848 (1st Cir. 1978).
49. 262 S.E.2d 744 (W.V. 1979).
50. 262 S.E.2d at 749.
51. La. Code of Prof. Resp. DR 7-102 (found in Articles of Incorp., La. State Bar
Ass'n art. XVI; La. R.S. tit. 37, ch. 4, app. (1974)) [hereinafter cited as Code of Prof. Resp.].
52. Code of Prof. Resp. EC 7-10.
53. Code of Prof. Resp. EC 7-05.
54. Code of Prof. Resp. EC 7-22, DR 7-102.
19841
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such as Oregon, where good faith is not sufficient to prevent the imposi-
tion of penalties for frivolous appeal, an attorney would be well advised
to inform his client of the possibility of penalties before the decision to
appeal is made.
Constitutionality of Penalizing Frivolous Appeals
Attorneys have argued that when penalties under such statues are in-
volved in the decision of whether or not to bring an appeal, an unconstitu-
tional "chilling effect" of the litigant's right to appeal results. In Davis
v. Jonti,1" the appellant argued that article 907 of the Louisiana Code
of Practice inhibited the exercise of his right of appeal granted by the
Louisiana Constitution of 1812. The court found no violation of the ap-
pellant's constitutional rights, stating that the right of appeal was limited
by restrictions which the rights of others rendered necessary. 6 Further,
the Orleans Circuit Court of Appeal found in Mauberet v. Mauberet"
that the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, article I, section 6, supported
article 907.58 Section 6 guaranteed "adequate remedy by due process of
law" and further provided that justice was to be administered without
"unreasonable delay." Thus, these same guarantees, now found in article
I, section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, seem to support the
current Louisiana frivolous appeal statute, Code of Civil Procedure arti-
cle 2164.
Kentucky has eliminated challenges under section 115 of its constitu-
tion, which grants litigants a first appeal as matter of right, by providing
in Kentucky Revised Statute 26A.300(1) that no damages shall be
assessed on a first appeal of right. On any suspensive appeal of a money
judgment other than a first appeal of right, however, a penalty of ten
percent of the amount of the judgment is imposed against the appellant
if the judgment is affirmed or the appeal is dismissed."
In Florida, an appellant argued that the state's frivolous appeal statute
impinged on the Court of Appeals' procedural rulemaking authority under
the state constitution. This argument was rejected by the Florida court,
which held that an award of attorney's fees is a matter of substantive
law properly under the aegis of the legislature.60 A more successful con-
stitutional argument was made in California. In In re Marriage of
Flaherty,6 the California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, found that the
sua sponte application against appellant's attorney of the California
55. 14 La. 95 (1839).
56. 14 La. at 96.
57. 12 La. App. 553, 125 So. 886 (Orl. 1930).
58. 12 La. App. at 554-55, 125 So. at 886-87.
59. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300(2) (1983).
60. Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
61. 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982).
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frivolous appeal statute (Code of Civil Procedure article 907) deprived
the attorney of property without due process of law in violation of both
the United States and California constitutions. The court stated that fun-
damental fairness required that sanctions against an attorney be imposed
only after notice, an opportunity to respond, and a hearing.62 Louisiana's
frivolous appeal statute has no such constitutional infirmities because notice
is given in the answer to appeal, 63 the appellant may respond in a rebut-
tal brief6 4 and in oral argument, and a hearing on the merits is required
before penalties can be assessed.6"
The Future of Louisiana's Frivolous Appeal Statute
Although Code of Civil Procedure article 2164 may be free from con-
stitutional problems, the Louisiana appellate practitioner will find that
article 2164 suffers from three jurisprudentially created problems which
prevent it from reaching its full potential in deterring frivolous appeals.
The first problem is that of the partially frivolous appeal in which the
appellant has one meritorious ground for appeal and other clearly frivolous
grounds. The appellee's attorney is forced to rebut the frivolous grounds
in his answer to the appeal, which may involve additional legal research,
thus increasing the attorneys' fees which must be paid by the appellee
if his counsel is charging on an hourly basis. While Louisiana courts have
awarded damages when the defendant appeals suspensively from an en-
tire judgment which includes sums admittedly due,6 6 the courts have other-
wise refused to award damages when partially frivolous grounds are urged
on appeal if the appellant is accorded at least part of the relief requested
based on his meritorious ground. 67 It seems unfair that the appellee should
be denied damages at least equal to his increased attorneys' fees in such
cases. While the courts may feel that when an issue is blatantly frivolous
the additional attorneys' fees involved in rebutting the issues are nominal,
even the imposition of nominal damages might serve to deter appellant's
counsel from urging these frivolous grounds.
A more serious problem created by the courts' interpretation of arti-
cle 2164 arises when an appellant abandons an appeal obviously taken
solely for delay, as when a defendant appeals a default judgment but
files no appellate brief. The appellee has two choices in this situation-he
62. 183 Cal. Rptr. at 517-19, 646 P.2d at 188-90.
63. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2133.
64. La. Cts. App. R. 2-12.6, in West's Louisiana Rules of Court 1984.
65. Thomas v. Guilbeau, 35 La. Ann. 927, 930 (1883).
66. Elkins' Heirs v. Elkins' Executor, 11 La. 224 (1837); Galland v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., No. 83-746, slip op. (La. App. 3d Cir. June 27, 1984); Dwyer Lumber Co.
v. Murphy Lumber & Supply Co., 116 So. 2d 64 (La. App. lst Cir. 1959).
67. Starwood v. Taylor, 434 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Galloway
v. Minckler, 63 So. 2d 891, 892 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
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may have the appeal dismissed as abandoned or he may file an answer
and await affirmance. If he follows the first course of action, he incurs
additional legal expense for preparation of the motion to dismiss the ap-
peal and the supporting memorandum. He may also be damaged by the
delay,68 which may be as much as eighty-five days.69 Yet only if he follows
the second course of action may he obtain damages under article 2164.0
If the purpose of sanctions for frivolous appeals is to compensate
the victim of a wholly non-meritorious appeal and penalize a party who
has wasted the court's time and resources, the rule seems to defeat these
purposes. Unless the appellee incurs additional delay and expense and
answers the appeal, he cannot be compensated for the original delay and
loss, and the frivolous appellant is not penalized. Yet such an appellant
should be penalized, and it would be judicially efficient to encourage
dismissals of abandoned suits by awarding damages under article 2164
in such a situation.
The last and perhaps greatest difficulty in the application of article
2164 is the extremely subjective test set forth by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Parker v. Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co.7" as to when
damages may be awarded. Under that test, if the appellant's counsel pro-
fesses sincerity in the position he advocates, a court may award damages
only if "the proposition advocated is so ridiculous or so opposed to ra-
tional thinking that it is evident beyond any doubt that it is being
deliberately professed for ulterior purposes." 7 2 This test is so difficult for
an appellee to meet that article 2164 is rendered almost meaningless ex-
cept to those seeking damages for delay caused by an abandoned appeal.
This is evidenced by the paucity of awards made to appellees under arti-
cle 2164.
While appeals taken in bad faith certainly should be penalized, a pro-
clamation of good faith should not relieve the appellant from all penalties
in all situations. For example, an appellant who asserts a position
68. For example, when a plaintiff frivolously appeals a judgment in favor of a defen-
dant insurer, the insurer incurs additional administrative expenses in keeping its file open
and maintaining its reserves. When a defendant delays payment of a judgment by a frivolous
suspensive appeal, the plaintiff is denied the use of the funds to which he is entitled during
the pendency of the appeal. If conventional interest exceeds legal interest during this time,
as it has during recent periods of high inflation, the plaintiff loses the interest he could
have earned.
69. Code of Civil Procedure article 2125 provides that the return day shall be 60 days
from the date the appeal is granted. The appellant then has 25 days after the record is
lodged to file his brief. La. Cts. App. R. 2-12.7, in West's Louisiana Rules of Court 1984.
Extensions of time are allowed both for the return date and for filing the appellant's brief.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 2125; La. Cts. App. R. 2-12.8, in West's Louisiana Rules of Court 1984.
70. See supra text accompaning note 23.
71. 248 La. 449, 179 So. 2d 634 (1965).
72. 248 La. at 457, 179 So. 2d at 637.
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repeatedly rejected by the Louisiana courts should not escape liability for
subjecting his opponent to the expense and delay of an appeal by pro-
fessing his personal belief that the law is wrong. Similarly, an appellant
whose counsel fails to do necessary legal research and consequently bases
an appeal on an incorrect view of the law should not be allowed to escape
penalties under article 2164 by asserting good faith. Denying damages in
such a situation simply rewards incompetency.
Perhaps the appellate courts are reluctant to find that an attorney
has advocated a ridiculous or irrational position because to do so would
be tantamount to finding that the attorney has failed to exercise the degree
of care and skill exercised by a prudent practicing attorney, i.e., that he
has committed legal malpractice." Whatever the reason, it appears that
Louisiana appellate courts, by maintaining a standard for the appellate
practitioner which encourages incompetency, have ignored the plea of Chief
Justice Burger that the "serious problem of advocate competency" be
addressed. "
A balance must be struck between the appellant's right to take an
appeal and the appellee's right to be free from harassing, vexatious litiga-
tion. Imposition of liability whenever the appellate court finds the appeal
lacks merit would tip the balance too far in favor of the appellee, but
the Parker test tips the balance too far in favor of the appellant. A more
objective test of whether any reasonable attorney would conclude that
the appeal is totally devoid of merit would be a more effective deterrent
to frivolous appeals, yet would not favor the appellee to such a degree
as to "chill" the assertion of the right to appeal.
If the obstacles to the application of article 2164 are to be alleviated,
it appears legislative action will be necessary. Parker is the only case to
have reached the Louisiana Supreme Court since the enactment of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure more than twenty years ago, and it
is unlikely that the court will have the opportunity to review Parker in
the near future. As long as the courts of appeal follow Parker and award
damages only in the most flagrant cases of abuse of the appellate pro-
cess, it is unlikely that an appellant who knowingly advocated a ridiculous
position in bad faith and was consequently assessed with damages under
article 2164 will apply for writs and risk the imposition of additional
penalties by the supreme court. It is even more unlikely that an appellee
whose judgment has been affirmed will apply for and be granted writs
solely on the issue of whether damages under article 2164 should have
73. Although an attorney is not required to exercise perfect judgment in every instance,
he is obligated to exercise at least the degree of care, skill, and diligence that is exercised
by prudent practicing attorneys in his locality. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972).
74. Burger, Some Further Reflections on the Problem of Adequacy of Trial Counsel,
49 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 19-20 (1980).
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been awarded, since the penalties he might recover probably will not off-
set the additional delay involved in the appeal.
An amendment to article 2164 setting forth a more objective stan-
dard and specifically providing that damages are allowable upon dismissal
for abandonment, whether an answer has been filed or not, would revitalize
the article and would help relieve congested appellate court dockets. This
writer strongly suggests that such an amendment should be considered
by the legislature in the near future.
Gail Sweeney Stephenson
